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Employee Notice Requirements Under
the Family and Medical Leave Act:
Are They Manageable?
Robert J. Aalberts*
Lome H. Seidman"
Almost two thirds of the labor force in the United States works for
employers covered by the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of
1993.' Nearly fifty-five percent of U.S. workers also meet the FMLA's
definition of "eligible" employee.' As one commentator, Jane Rigler, has
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bin Professor Aalberts's research pursuits are in the areas of employment law and
real estate law. He has published over 60 articles in law reviews and business jour-
nals, including the Pepperdine Law Review, American Business Law Journal,
Georgetown Journal of Legal Ethics, DePaul Law Review, Marquette Law Review,
Louisiana Law Review, Southern Illinois University Law Journal, Labor Law Jour-
nal, Journal' of Small Business Management, Employee Relations Law Journal, Inter-
national Journal of Conflict Management, Benefits Law Journal, and others. Profes-
sor Aalberts is currently the editor in chief of the Real Estate Law Journal and is a
co-author of LAw AND BUSINESS AND THE REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT (4th ed. 1994).
** Lome H. Seidman is Professor of Legal Studies in the College of Business and
Economics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas. He received his Juris Doctor from
Case Western Reserve University. Professor Seidman's research interests are in the ar-
eas of employment law, comparative law, and the history of law. His articles have
appeared in numerous journals and law reviews, including the Pepperdine Law Re-
view, Marquette Law Review, Southwestern Law Review, Labor Law Journal, South-
ern Illinois University Law Journal, Cornell Hotel and Restaurant Administration
Quarterly, Employee Relations Law Journal, International Journal of Conflict Man-
agement, and the Journal of Small Business Management.
1. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, A WORKABLE BALANCE: REPORT TO CONGRESS ON FAMILY
AND MEDICAL LEAVE POLICIES xvi (1996) [hereinafter A WORKABLE BALANCE]; The Fami-
ly and Medical Leave Act, Pub. L No. 103-3, 107 Stat 6 (1993) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 2601-2654 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
2. A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 1, at xvi. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.110 (1996) for
detailed coverage of what is an "eligible" employee.
1209
noted, the FMLA "represents a fundamental change in the way Ameri-
can employers are required to acknowledge and accommodate employ-
ees and their families."3 Indeed, there is ample data to support Rigler's
conclusion.4
The "change" is a legislative response to what Congress perceived as
a "demographic revolution" in the composition of the U.S. workplace
and the increasing number of elderly Americans.5 The Bureau of Labor
of Statistics, for example, notes that the female labor force is expand-
ing, and predicts that it will reach 66.1% of American workers by 2005.6
Moreover, in 1993 the Families and Work Institute predicted that two
thirds of women with preschool children and three quarters of women
with children in school would be part of the job force by 1995.' "Equal-
ly dramatic" is the substantial number of single-parent households that
have resulted from divorce, separation, and out-of-wedlock births.' Fi-
nally, due to advances in medical technology and health care, the el-
derly are the fastest-growing segment of the American population, and
they frequently require the care of their working children.9 For exam-
3. Jane Rigler, Analysis and Understanding of the Family and Medical Leave Act
of 1993, 45 CASE W. RES. L. Rnv. 457, 458 (1995) (discussing the rights, obligations,
inconsistencies, and shortcomings of the FMLA).
4. Before the FMLA, employees generally received family and medical leave only
if they had a voluntary or collective bargaining agreement which contained such a
provision or if state laws required such leave. See A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note
1, at xiii. However, only a quarter to a third of those policies offered by employers
were comparable to the protections now given by the FMLA. Id. The remaining em-
ployer policies generally did not provide for the care of a seriously ill parent, child,
spouse, or newborn, newly adopted, or foster child. Id. Moreover, when employers
handled these cases on an ad hoc basis, the leaves were shorter than those of the
FMLA, and benefits were not always maintained for the employee. Id. Also, prior to
the passage of the FILA, at least 35 states possessed some type of law requiring
unpaid family or medical leave, but state laws varied greatly. See Sabra Craig, Note,
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Survey of the Act's History, Purposes,
Provisions, and Social Ramifications, 44 DRAm L Ruv. 51, 54-57 (1995) (discussing
state laws regarding maternity leave). The FMLA does not supersede existing state or
local laws providing family leave as long as the state or local laws provide greater
rights than those offered by the Act. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.701(a).
5. S. REP. No. 103-3, at 5-7 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7-9 (dis-
cussing the demographic changes which warrant passage of the FMLA).
6. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.
7. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8.
8. Id. at 6, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8 ("The Census Bureau reports that
single parents accounted for 27 percent of all family groups with children under 18
years old in 1988, more than twice the 1970 proportion.").
9. Id. at 6-7, reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 8-9 ("Currently 32 million Ameri-
cans are aged 65 and over, comprising 12 percent of the population. Between 1980
and 1990, the number of people aged 75 or older grew by nearly one third.").
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ple, studies show that families or friends provide between sixty and
eighty percent of the care provided to the elderly.'"
These new demographics reveal a potential conflict in the
workplace." Workers must meet the reasonable demands of their em-
ployers as well as the demands of everyday life.' Given that in 1993
forty percent of all employees believed that they would require FMLA
leave at some time in the next five years,'3 and given that current De-
partment of Labor (DOL) regulations require employers "to responsively
answer questions from employees concerning their rights and respon-
sibilities under the FMLA," it becomes imperative that employers also
understand their rights and responsibilities under the Act.'4
This Article will, after reviewing the basic requirements of the FMLA,
focus on the affirmative responsibility of employees to provide their
employers with the notice required for FMLA leave.'" As this Article
will note, the concept of adequate notice, although required by current
DOL regulations, has been defined by the federal courts. The trend in
10. A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 1, at 9-10.
11. The conflicts and misunderstandings between employers and employees are
likely to be greater than most people realize. As of January 1997, the Department of
Labor (DOL) had received more than 6300 complaints of FMLA violations. Family
Leave Details Now on Hotline, DALLAs MORNING NEWs, Jan. 21, 1997, at 13D. In re-
sponse to the volume of complaints, the DOL announced that as of January 21, 1997,
it now has a toll-free number. 1-800-959-FMILA Id. Callers will receive a brief expla-
nation of the FMLA and learn how to get more in-depth information concerning the
Act. Id.
12. The real-life conflicts and struggles between employers and employees over
family leave have generated not only the interest of lawmakers, but of the popular
press and even Hollywood. For example, in January 1997, CBS premiered the made-
for-TV movie A Child's Wish, based on the true story of a family whose daughter
became seriously ill Her father later lost his job taking leave to care for her. That
story is then contrasted with another family whose terminally ill daughter could be
cared for because the FMLA had been enacted. The movie featured a cameo appear-
ance by President Clinton speaking about the Act A Child's Wish (CBS television
broadcast, Jan. 21, 1997); see also Clinton's TV Role Mimicked Real Life, CHATrANoo-
GA TIMES, Jan. 22, 1997, at All.
13. A WORKABLE BALANCE, supra note 1, at xix. The study also found that one
fifth of all workers in the 1993 study had a need at that time for FMLA-covered
leave. Id.
14. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d) (1996).
15. See generally id, §§ 825.302-.304 (discussing employee notice requirements). See
irfra notes 55-70 and accompanying text for a discussion of employee notice require-
ments.
16. See infra notes 71-149 and accompanying text (discussing federal courts' inter-
pretations of employee notice requirements).
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recent decisions is a matter of capital importance to employers because
proper or improper notice of FMLA leave establishes the employer's
right to require medical certification 7 or to initiate disciplinary ac-
tion."8 In addition, awareness of the employee's FMLA notice require-
ment will permit employers to avoid the possible contention that the
employer has elected to waive a right that the Act specifically grants."
THE FMLA- How IT WORKS
The FMLA covers employers' who engage in interstate commerce
and who employ fifty or more employees2' for each working day dur-
ing each of twenty or more calendar work weeks in the current or pre-
ceding calendar year.' Although the current regulations distinguish an
independent contractor from an employee,' the concept of an "em-
ployee" under the FMIA is broader than the common law concept of
master and servant. 2' Moreover, "[m]ere knowledge by an employer of
17. 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.305-.307 (discussing employee medical certification require-
ments).
18. See id. § 825.304 (discussing an employer's recourse against an employee who
fails to give adequate notice as required under the FMLA).
19. Id. § 825.304(a) ("An employer may waive employee's FMLA notice obligations
or the employer's own internal rules on leave notice requirements.").
20. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A) (1994). The definition of what constitutes an "employer"
also encompasses any "public agency" as defined under the Fair Labor Standards Act
of 1938. Id. § 2611(4)(A)(iii) (stating the definition "includes any 'public agency' as
defined in section 203(x) of this title.") Accordingly, this definition would include the
U.S. government, its agencies, states and their political subdivisions, the District of
Columbia, and territories or possessions of the United States. Id.
21. The manner for determining if an employer employs the requisite number of
employees to invoke FMLA coverage may be influenced by a recent U.S. Supreme
Court case, Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660
(1996). In Walters, the Court unanimously ruled that courts must use the "payroll
method," in which all workers recorded on an employer's weekly payroll must count
toward the minimum jurisdictional amount required under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1994). Id. at 664. Prior to the ruling, some cir-
cuits, such as the 7th Circuit from which Walters was appealed, held that hourly or
part-time workers could count as employees only on days in which they were physi-
cally present at work. See E.E.O.C. v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 60 F.3d 1225
(7th Cir. 1995), rev'd, Walters v. Metropolitan Educ. Enter., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 660
(1996). Indeed, the FMLA regulations appear to endorse this method. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 825.105(b) (1996) ("Any employee whose name appears on the employer's payroll
will be considered employed each working day of the calendar week, and must be
counted whether or not any compensation is received for the week.").
22. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(1).
23. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.105(a) ("In general an employee, as distinguished from an
independent contractor who is engaged in a business of his/her own, is one who
'follows the usual path of an employee' and is dependent on the business in which
he/she serves.").
24. See id.
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work done for the employer by another is sufficient to create the em-
ployment relationship under the act."2" In addition, employees on
leave, paid or unpaid, and employees suspended for disciplinary or
other reasons count as employees."
An employee is eligible to take FMLA leave, assuming the notice
requirement is met, once the employee has (1) been employed for at
least twelve months (the months need not be consecutive); 7 (2) been
employed for at least 1250 hours during the previous twelve-month
period;' and (3) been employed at a work site where fifty or more
employees are employed (by the same employer) within seventy-five
miles' of the work site.'
The FMLA allows leave when an eligible employee of a covered em-
ployer meets the notice requirement. This leave may be taken because
(1) it relates to the birth or care of the employee's newborn child;3 (2)
it is the result of the placement of a child with the employee for adop-
tion or foster care;' (3) it concerns the care of an employee's child,
The definition of "employ" for purposes of FMLA is taken from the Fair
Labor Standards Act, § 3(g). The courts have made it clear that the employ-
ment relationship under the FISA is broader than the traditional common law
concept of master and servant. The difference between the employment rela-
tionship under the FLSA and that under the common law arises from the
fact that the term "employ" as defined in the Act includes "to suffer or per-
mit to work." The courts have indicated that, while "to permit" requires a
more positive action than "to suffer," both terms imply much less positive ac-
tion than required by the common law.
Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 825.105(c).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A)(i) (1994).
28. Id. § 2611(2)(A)(ii).
29. Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 825, Final Rule, Apr. 6, 1995, p. 12 ("The regulations have been
clarified by deleting the reference to 'radius,' a term not found in the statute. The 75-
mile distance will be measured by surface miles using available transportation by the
most direct route between worksites."). The FMLA considers separate buildings a
work site if "they are in reasonable geographic proximity," and for employees with
no fixed work site (e.g., truck drivers), a work site is their "home base." Id.
31. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A) (1994); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(c) (allowing leave to
commence prior to the birth of the child for such activities as prenatal care or for
women unable to work because of their pregnancy).
32. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(B); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.112(b) (granting leave for the
adoption of a child, including such reasons as attending counseling sessions, appear-
ing in court, and consulting with a lawyer).
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spouse or parent having a serious health condition;' or (4) it is the
result of the employee's serious health condition where the employee is
unable to perform the requirements of his or her job.'
When leave is taken pursuant to the FMLA, it entitles the employee
to reinstatement to his or her former position or an equivalent position
with the same benefits and terms of employment.3 Failure to abide by
these provisions can subject an employer' to compensatory damag-
33. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.113(a) (1996) (defining "spouse"
as a husband or wife under state law including common law, if applicable). "Parent"
can mean biological parents as well as anyone "in loco parentis" for the employee
when the employee was a child. Id. § 825.113(b). A "son" or "daughter" can be the
biological, adopted, foster or stepchild, legal ward, or child of a person "in loco pa-
rentis," and can be over eighteen if the child cannot care for himself or herself or is
disabled inder the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Id. § 825.113(c).
34. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). See 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(1-2) (1996) for a discus-
sion of what constitutes a "serious medical condition" under the FMLA. See generally
Robert J. Aalberts & Lorne H. Seidman, The Family and Medical Leave Act: Does It
Make Unreasonable Demands on Employers?, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 135 (1996) (discussing
how the courts have interpreted "serious medical condition" under the FMLA).
35. 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1) (1994); see 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(a) (1996) (discussing the
employee's rights after returning from FMLA leave).
36. The term "employer" under the FMLA is similar to that of the Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act's definition. See supra note 20 and accompanying text. In respect to em-
ployer liability, there is a judicial trend toward finding no individual liability under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA, and the ADEA. However, individual super-
visors may be found liable under the FLSA if they are capable of exercising supervi-
sory authority over an employee who later complains. Thus, because the definitions
under the two Acts are similar, by analogy supervisors may likewise be found liable
under the FMIA See Paul J. Kennedy & Ronald L Tisch, When Supervisors Are Sued,
42 HRMAGAZINE 124 (1997); see also Corey E. Fleming, 'Family Leave Act' Plaintiff
Wins $58,000 Jury Verdict, LAw. WKY. USA, Nov. 4, 1996, at 1 (discussing Preemon
v. Foley, No. 95-C-209 (N.D. li. Sept. 26, 1996), in which there is no written opinion).
But see Frizzell v. Southwest Motor Freight, Inc., 906 F. Supp. 441 (E.D. Tenn. 1995)
(holding that employees cannot sue individual supervisors under the FMLA). Employ-
ment agencies which are the primary employer and are responsible for required no-
tices regarding FMLA leave might also be jointly liable with the client company under
the FMLA. See Brent M. Giddens, When Temporary Employees Bring Discrimination
or Labor Suits Against Their Employment Agencies, the Client-Employers May Be
Subject to Joint Liability, NAT'L L J., Jan. 13, 1997, at B6.
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es37 and equitable relief.' It is appropriate to state that "the essence
of the FMLA is the concept of 'job security.'"'
OVERVIEW OF THE FMLA NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
On February 5, 1993, President Clinton signed the FMLA into law,4 °
with the Act taking effect for most covered workers on August 5,
1993.4" At that time President Clinton gave his assessment of the Act:
"American workers will no longer have to choose between the job they
37. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(1) (1994) (discussing how "wages, salary, employ-
ment benefits, or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of
the violation" can be granted); see also id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(ll) (granting "any actual
monetary losses sustained by the employee as a direct result of the violation, such as
the cost of providing care, up to a sum equal to twelve weeks of wages or salary
for the employee"). Moreover, the damages can double if the employer did not act in
good faith. In such a case, the statute provides "an additional amount as liquidated
damages equal to the sum of the amount described in clause (i) [Le., wages, benefits,
etc.] and the interest" on those amounts can also be awarded. See id.
§ 2617(a)(1)(A)(iii). At least one federal district court has also ruled that a plaintiff,
who the employer retaliated against for taling FMLA leave, can receive not only
damages incurred from the time of his demotion to his termination by his employer,
but also for damages suffered from the time of termination to the date of trial, and
even damages incurred for benefits or compensation lost or denied after the verdict.
See Dawn E. Conner, 'Family Leave Act' Plaintiff Gets $313,000 Jury Verdict, LAW.
WKLY. USA, Dec. 16, 1996, at 1, 12 (discussing Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No.
CA-0056-H (W.D. V& 1996), a case in which no written opinion is available). The
plaintiffs award can also double if the employer had not acted in good faith. Id. at
12. This is, at least to the authors' knowledge, the first case awarding damages for
"front pay" as well as "back pay." Id.
38. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1)(B).
39. Rigler, supra note 3, at 469.
40. Doing the Leave-Policy Shq&ffe, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 8, 1993, at 21.
President Clinton frequently refers to the FMLA as a "hallmark of his administration."
See Hilary Stout, Clinton to Seek Wider FamilyLeave Law, WALL ST. J., June 25,
1996, at A2. Moreover, President Clinton seeks to expand the Act to include parent-
teacher conferences, children's doctor's appointments, and taking elderly relatives to
medical appointments or other professional services that may be related to their care.
See Corey E. Fening, Will Congress Expand the 'Family Leave Act'?, LAw. WKLY.
USA, Nov. 18, 1996, at 18.
41. 29 C.F.R. § 825.102(a) (1996); see also id. § 825.700(c)(1) (discussing the effec-
tive date of FMLA when a collective bargaining agreement already exists).
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need and the family they love."42 One commentator concluded that the
Act is an "appropriate step toward an enhanced quality of work life."'
However, in addition to providing employees and employers with a
variety of specific rights and obligations, the FMLA raises certain diffi-
cult questions that are now being answered by our courts. Some of
these issues, such as what constitutes a serious health problem and
who qualifies as a son, daughter, and parent, have already received
attention by this Article's authors" and others in both journals45 and
the popular press.4" Still, the requirement that employees must provide
employers with notice of the need for protected FMIA leave has re-
ceived little attention and has resulted in costly litigation.47
42. Statement on Signing the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 WEEKLY
CoMp. PREs. Doc. 144-45 (Feb. 8, 1993).
43. Rigler, supra note 3, at 505.
44. See Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 34, at 135.
45. See, e.g., Tim Barnett et al., An Overview of the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, 44 LAB. LJ. 429 (1993); Dana Brody, Note, Current Developments in the
Law: A Survey of Cases Addressing the Family and Medical Leave Act, 5 B.U. PUB.
INT. LJ. 367 (1996); Alice E. Conway, A Guide to Practical Knowledge of the FMLA
and Its Complex New Final Regulations, 46 LAB. UJ. 515 (1995); Nancy R. Daspit,
Comment, The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Great Idea But a 'Rube
Goldberg' Solution?, 43 EMORY LJ. 1351 (1994); Andrew Devney, Note, Current Devel-
opments in the Law: A Survey of Cases Addressing the Family and Medical Leave
Act, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. LJ. 361 (1996); Gerald L Maatman, Jr. & Andrew J. Boling,
What You Should Know About the Family and Medical Leave Act, 39 No. 5 PRAc.
LAW. 21 (1993); Martin H. Malin, Fathers and Parental Leave, 72 TEx L REv. 1047
(1994); Kevin G. Martin, Employment Law, 46 SYRACUSE L REv. 499 (1995); Elizabeth
Mitchell, Note, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Cases Addressing the
Family and Medical Leave Act, 5 B.U. PuB. INT. UJ. 352 (1996); Amy Offenberg,
Note, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of Cases Addressing the Family
and Medical Leave Act, 5 B.U. Pun. INT. UJ. 379 (1996); Carol Daugherty Rasnic, The
United States' 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act: How Does It Compare with
Work Leave in European Countries?, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L 105 (1994); Rigler, supra
note 3; Cheryl 1R Saban & Dena Sacco, An FMLA Compliance Update: What Every
Employer Should Know About the Final Rules, 21 No. 1 EMPLOY. REL UJ. 145
(1995); Garth L Schneider, Note, Current Developments in the Law: A Survey of
Cases Addressing the Family and Medical Leave Act, 5 B.U. PuB. INT. UJ. 371
(1996).
46. See, e.g., Employer Errors Common in Family Leave Act, INDLNMIOeUs Bus. J.,
Dec. 16, 1996, at 15; Jane E. Reddin, Avoiding Employer Mistakes Under FMLA,
ARiz. Bus. GAzETrE, Oct. 17, 1996, at 24; Sue Shellenbarger, Family Leave Is Law,
But Climate Is Poor For Actually Taking It, WAL ST. J., Oct. 30, 1996, at BI; Doing
the Leave-Policy Shvje, supra note 40, at 21; Stout, supra note 40, at A2.
47. See, e.g., Timothy Stewart Bland, The Required Content of Employees' Notice to
Employers of the Need for Leave Under the FMLA, 12 LAB. LAw. 235 (1996).
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EMPLOYER'S NOTICE REQUIREMENT
First, to demonstrate the contrast, it should be noted that although
the FMLA compels the employer to inform employees of their right to
take FMLA leave, no significant litigation has resulted from this require-
ment.' The reason is that current regulations specify how and where
this must be done in "cookbook" detail.
The FMLA mandates that employers post information explaining the
Act where employees work.49 Employers must post this information
"prominently where it can be readily seen" and in print "large enough to
be easily read."' Further, if a significant number of employees are not
literate in English, then employers must post the information in a lan-
guage in which they are literate.5'
The FMLA outlines specific directions on how and when to provide
more personal notice concerning the employees' rights and obligations.
If the employer provides written guidance to employees, in a handbook,
for example, then employers must likewise include the information
concerning the employees' rights and obligations.' If employers do not
use such publications, then every employee must receive written guid-
ance in some other form, detailing their rights and obligations, and the
DOL will provide an "FMLA Fact Sheet" for distribution to em-
ployees.'
Thus, it can be safely stated that if employers take the time necessary
to read two provisions' of the current regulations, then they can de-
48. For example, most of the reported cases have been concerned with such is-
sues as what constitutes a "serious health condition," and what is sufficient notice by
the employee to the employer in order to receive FMLA protections. See Aalberts &
Seidman, supra note 34, at 138.
49. 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(a) (1996).
Every employer covered by the FMLA is required to post and keep posted on
its premises, in conspicuous places where employees are employed, whether
or not it has any "eligible" employees, a notice explaining the Act's provi-
sions and providing information concerning the procedures for filing com-
plaints of violations of the Act with the Wage and Hour Division.
Id,
50. Id. ("The notice must be posted prominently where it can be readily seen by
employees and applicants for employment.").
51. Id. § 825.300(c) ("Where an employer's workforce is comprised of a significant
portion of workers who are not literate in English, the employer shall be responsible
for providing the notice in a language in the which the employees are literate.").
52. Id. § 825.301(a)(1).
53. Id. § 825.301(a)(2).
54. Id, §§ 825.300-.301 (comprising the employers' regulatory notice requirements
1217
termine if their procedures comply with the FMLA's notice requirement.
Unfortunately, gauging the sufficiency of the employees' notice require-
ment is not so easily accomplished. In fact, gaining this ability requires
much more than merely reading regulations or contacting the DOL.
EMPLOYEES' NOTICE REQUIREMENT
Of course, there are regulations that address the employees' notice
requirement, and these regulations do provide some useful information.
One regulation concerns a situation in which the employees' need for
FMLA leave is foreseeable, and a second provides guidance when the
need for FMLA leave is not foreseeable.'
On several points, the regulations take parallel positions. Assuming
the employer has properly met its notice requirement, the employee
must provide the employer with notice of the need for FMLA leave.'
In both situations, the notice given to the employer can be verbal or by
other reasonable means.57 Also, in both situations, there are at least
guidelines regarding the timeliness of notice by the employee. In the
case of the need for unforeseen leave, the FMLA requires notice "within
no more than one or two working days," or "as soon as practicable
under the facts and circumstances" of a particular situation.s When
the need for FMLA leave is foreseeable, the FMLA expects thirty days'
advance notice if practical. If advance notice is not practical (e.g., due
to a medical emergency), then notice must be given "as soon as practi-
cable. " ' In either case, the employee does not need to expressly assert
rights under the FMLA or even mention the Act.' The employee need
only express the need for FMLA leave, thus qualifying for the leave. The
under the FMLA).
55. See 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302-.303; see infra notes 56-66 and accompanying text.
56. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302-.303 (discussing employee requirements for
FMLA-qualifying leave).
57. Id. § 825.302(c) ("An employee shall provide at least verbal notice sufficient to
make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying leave and the
anticipated timing and duration of the leave."); see also id. § 825.303(b) (discussing
employee notice requirements when FMLA leave is not foreseeable and stating that
an employee's notice should be given "to the employer either in person or by tele-
phone, telegraph, facsimile (fax) machine or other electronic means. Notice may be
given by the employee's spokesperson (e.g., spouse, adult family member or other
responsible party) if the employee is unable to do so personally.").
58. Id. § 825.303(a).
59. Id. § 825.302(a).
60. Id. § 825.302(c) ("The employee need not . . . even mention the FMLA [for
foreseeable leave], but may only state that leave is needed for an expected birth or
adoption, for example."); id. § 825.303(b) ("The employee need not expressly assert
rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA [for unforeseeable FMLA leave],
but may only state that leave is needed.").
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burden then shifts to the employer to gather additional information6
and medical certification.'
The FMLA barely addresses the content of the employees' notice to
the employer.' In the event the FMLA leave is foreseeable, the
employees' notice must make the employer aware of the employee's
needs.' It is reasonable to believe similar language would have been
included in the regulations governing unforeseeable leave had Congress
drafted the regulations more concisely. But while the FMLA specifies
the employer's notice to employees in great detail," managers must
look to the courts in an effort to determine when the content of the
notice they receive demands protected FMLA leave.' Unfortunately,
the reasoning of federal judges on this issue, unguided by adequate
regulations, has not sailed by a fixed star.
Because the current regulations (effective April 6, 1995) parallel the
preceding regulations regarding the adequacy of the employees' notice
requirement, cases prior to April 6, 1995, provide useful guidance in an
attempt to track the trend of judicial reasoning." This parallel analysis
61. Id. § 825.302(c) ("The employer should inquire further of the employee if it is
necessary to have more information about whether FMLA leave is being sought by
the employee, and should obtain the necessary details of the leave to be taken.").
62. Id. ("In the case of medical conditions, the employer may find it necessary to
inquire further to determine if the leave is because of a serious health condition and
may request medical certification to support the need for such leave."); see also id.
§ 825.305 (regarding the employee's requirement to furnish medical certification if re-
quested by the employer).
63. The legislative history accompanying the FMLA also fails to address employee
notice requirements with any specificity. See S. REP. No. 103-3, at 25 (1993), reprint-
ed in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 27 (providing that "[e]mployees who face emergency medi-
cal conditions or unforeseen changes will not be precluded from taking leave if they
are unable to give 30 days' advance notice."); see also H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at
38 (1993) (providing that "30 day advance notice is not required in cases of medical
emergency or other unforeseen events").
64. 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) ("An employee shall provide at least verbal notice suffi-
cient to make the employer aware that the employee needs FMLA-qualifying
leave. . . ).
65. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
66.' See supra notes 55-64 and accompanying text.
67. The differences between the interim regulations and the final regulations are
minor. Congress detected and resolved one minor difference between the two sets of
regulations that involved the employee notice requirement in the interim regulations.
Under the interim regulations, foreseeable FMLA leave did not require the employee
to "express certain rights under the FMLA or even mention the FMLA" See Manuel
v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 761 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing 29 C.F.R.
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must be done because, as noted above, over the next five years an
estimated forty percent of all employees will attempt to assert their
need for FMLA leave.'
No single case provides a clear beacon. Knowledge of what courts
will, and equally important, will not require an employee to provide
when giving adequate notice emerges from a review of existing case
law. Judges themselves acknowledge the difficulty with this area. "The
precise requirements... are unclear under the applicable regulations,"
one court has noted.' Another court has declined "to announce any
categorical rules" for notice by an employee, stating its content "will
depend on the facts and circumstances of each case."70 Still, when
considered as a whole, the existing body of case law does provide illu-
mination.
EARLY DECISIONS
Early federal court decisions demonstrated an inclination on the part
of judges to balance the specificity of detailed information employers
are required to give employees under the FMLA against the high degree
of specific information employees were required to provide their em-
ployers in order to gain the benefit of protected FMLA leave.7 Two
cases demonstrate this approach.
The first example is Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., decided in
November 1994.' This is the frequently referenced "ingrown toenail"
case,' although contrary to popular press commentary, the decision
was assessing the adequacy of notice provided by Ms. Manuel to her
employer, not the seriousness of a health condition.' Ms. Manuel had
§ 825.302(b) (1996)). However, the interim regulations did not mention this with re-
gard to unforeseeable leave. Manuel noted this discrepancy and considered it an
inadvertent omission by the regulators. Id. at 763 ("[R]equiring employees unable to
foresee their need for leave to expressly invoke the FMLA's protection would signifi-
cantly burden the employees. Employees often cannot foresee their need for medical
or family leave."). The final regulations adopted the Manuel court's position regarding
foreseeable leave. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b); supra note 60.
68. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
69. McGinnis v. Wonder Chem. Co., No. 95-4384, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18909, at
*11 (E.D. Pa- Dec. 21, 1995).
70. Manuel, 66 F.3d at 764.
71. See supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text
72. Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., No. 944691, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20996
(W.D. La. Nov. 30, 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995).
73. See, e.g., Susan A. Bocamazo, 'Absent' Workers Are Now Suing Under Federal
Law," LAw. WiY. USA, May 6, 1996, at 1, 16 (discussing Manuel in some detail un-
der the heading "Ingrown Toenail").
74. Manuel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20996, at *7 ("The dispute in this case centers
around notice.").
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been hired by Westlake in July 1986, and, beginning in 1987, missed a
substantial number of workdays in each of the following years.5 In
1992, Westlake established a "no fault" absence control policy under
which every absence was counted regardless of the reason." Excessive
absences led to a four-step disciplinary process, ending in termina-
tion.77 Ms. Manuel accumulated sufficient absences to reach the end of
the process and was terminated in February 1994.' She would not,
however, have been legally terminated if a number of her absences
were protected by the FMLA.' This was the nature of the lawsuit that
Ms. Manuel promptly filed.'
While the court did not assess the seriousness of the health problems
alleged by Ms. Manuel, it did note that complications and some hard-
ships followed the medical procedure to remove an ingrown toenail.8 .
The court also noted that Ms. Manuel contacted her supervisor the first
workday after she had received medical treatment "and informed him
of her inability to return to work."' "It is undisputed," the court stat-
ed, that the "plaintiff notified her supervisor of the need to miss
work... due to her infected toe" and that two days later she informed
her employer that "she would not be able to go into [sic] work since
her toe was badly swollen, and she was on crutches."' However, Ms.
Manuel failed to "request or otherwise intimate to Westlake Polymers
that she was taking FMLA leave. "'
In the absence of current DOL regulations that expressly state an
employee need not "expressly assert rights under the FMLA" (Manuel
was decided under interim regulations),' the district court concluded
that "it is not inconvenient nor unduly burdensome to require an em-
ployee in some manner to refer, or attempt to refer, to the Act."8o
75. Id. at *2.
76. Id.
77. Id. at *34.
78. Id. at *4.
79. Id. at *5.
80. Id.
81. Id. at *7 ("[She would not be able to go into [sic] work since her toe was
badly swollen, and she was on crutches.").
82. Id. at *3.
83. Id. at *7.
84. Id. at *7-8.
85. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
86. Manuel, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20996, at *10.
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In reaching its decision, the district court made two observations it
considered relevant at the time. First, the seriousness of the plaintiffs
health condition was not patently obvious.' Second, because Westlake
had met its notice requirement by posting pertinent provisions of the
FMLA on a bulletin board frequented by employees,' Ms. Manuel was
held to have actual notice of her obligations, even though she was in
fact unaware of the Act.'
Although the district court decision in Manuel did not survive an
appeal, and the DOL's current regulations directly counter Manuel, the
case serves to demonstrate that, at an early point in time some courts
were prepared to demand the specificity from employees that DOL
regulations demand from employers.
Demanding this balance also appears in another early case, Reich v.
Midwest Plastic Engineering, decided in July 1995.' Although Mid-
west Plastic began a shift from the rigid reasoning of Manuel by refus-
ing to require the employee to "refer, or attempt to refer"9' to the
FMLA, it clearly continued to demand substantial specificity in the
employee's notice requirements.9
The FMLA provides that the Secretary of Labor may bring an action
on behalf of an "affected employee."' In Midwest Plastic, Mr. Reich
believed that Ms. Van Dosen, a Midwest Plastic employee, met this
requirement.
As in Manuel, the seriousness of Ms. Van Dosen's health condition
was not at issue. Her illness (chicken pox) was a serious health condi-
tion within the meaning of the Act. 4 Indeed, the sole issue was wheth-
er Ms. Van Dosen adequately provided notice to her employer under the
FMLA requirements.95
On the morning of November 15, 1993, Ms. Van Dosen left a message
with her employer stating she believed she had contracted chicken pox
(her two daughters also had chicken pox), that she had been to an
87. Id. at *7.
88. Id. at *11-12; see supra notes 48-54 and accompanying text (discussing
employers' notice requirements under the FMLA).
89. Manuel, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20996, at *11.
90. No. 1:94-CV-525, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12130 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 1995). See
generally Schneider, supra note 45, at 371-75 (discussing the Midwest Plastic case in
detail).
91. Midwest Plastic, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12130, at *11.
92. See id.; see supra note 86 and accompanying text.
93. 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(1) (1994). "The Secretary may bring an action in any court
of competent jurisdiction to recover the damages described in subsection (a)(1)(A) of
this section." Id. § 2617(b)(2).
94. Midwest Plastic, 1995 U.S. Dist LEXIS 12130, at *7.
95. Id.
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emergency room the preceding day, and that she would be going to her
doctor that day.' Her doctor confirmed her illness, and on the next
day Ms. Van Dosen called a shift foreman and provided this informa-
tion.' Ms. Van Dosen was eventually hospitalized on the night of No-
vember 17.' She did not inform her employer of her hospitalization,
and the court did not accept her contention that a friend of hers had
provided this information.' It was not disputed that Ms. Van Dosen
did not call her employer on November 19, but did go to the bank on
that same date to make a car payment."° Ms. Van Dosen again saw a
doctor on November 22 and was excused from work until December
1.V o' Following a four-day Thanksgiving vacation Ms. Van Dosen pre-
pared to present her employer with a "doctor's slip," but her employer
terminated her before she could present the slip."° She very promptly
claimed her employer had violated the FMLA.' 3
The Midwest Plastic court declined to follow the Manuel requirement
that the employee specifically invoke FMLA leave. The court stated that
"at a minimum" the employee must give sufficient detail of the condi-
tion to make it evident that the FMLA protects the requested leave."°
The court concluded that Ms. Van Dosen did not meet this test.'°5
The court preceded this conclusion by illustrating its reasoning with
a hypothetical. The court used an example of two employees involved
in separate car accidents on the same day."° The first employee is in-
jured and hospitalized; the second employee is not injured and goes
fishing. 7 The next workday each employee calls their employer and
reports they will not be at work that day because they were involved in
a car accident the preceding day." Even though the first employee
96. Id. at *2-3.
97. Id. at *3.
98. Id.
99. Id. at *4 ("The Court found Mr. Long [the employer] the more credible witness
and accepts as true his testimony regarding the substance of their November 19 con-
versation.").
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at *5-6.
103. Id. at *6.
104. Id. at *9.
105. Id. at *14.
106. Id. at *10.
107. Id. at *10-11.
108. Id. at *11.
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had a serious health condition and the second did not, "neither employ-
ee provided the employer with adequate notice of their need for FMLA-
leave.""°
According to the Midwest Plastic court, in order to provide adequate
notice, the first employee should have stated that "he had been hospi-
talized as the result of the accident.""' Applying this hypothetical to
Ms. Van Dosen, the court noted that Ms. Van Dosen contacted her em-
ployer "on only three occasions," and in the course of these contacts
never gave sufficiently detailed information "to make it evident to Mid-
west that her leave was as the result of a 'serious health condition.'""'
She did not indicate her need for the continuing care of a health care
provider, nor did she indicate that she had been hospitalized as a result
of her having chicken pox."'
The court observed that notice must be given "'as soon as practica-
ble.'""3 The court suggested that "[s]urely, if Ms. Van Dosen was able
to go the bank on the afternoon of November 19, she was 'practicably'
able to" notify Midwest Plastic of her condition or at least give notice
by that date."
4
Although Ms. Van Dosen had a serious health condition, and even
though the court held that she need not specifically invoke the FMLA,
she had still failed to give adequate notice of protected leave."' The
court, although not following the more stringent requirements set forth
in Manuel, continued to support the concept that the courts should
balance the specific notice requirements imposed on employers under
the Act with the specific notice requirements imposed on employees by
the courts.
TRANSIrTONAL CASES
Within three weeks of the Midwest Plastic decision, a trend emerged
in federal decisions that demonstrated a movement away from the more
rigorous requirements expressed in Manuel"6 and Midwest Plas-
tic."7 This migration was first demonstrated in August 1995 in
Brannon v. Oshkosh B'Gosh, Inc.n8
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at *12.
112. Id.
113. Id. at *13 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) (1996)).
114. Id.
115. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 104-14 and accompanying text.
118. 897 F. Supp. 1028 (M.D. Tenn. 1995). See generaUy Offenberg, supra note 45,
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In Brannon, the court again examined an employer's elaborate absen-
teeism policy to determine whether leave taken by Ms. Brannon was
protected under the FMLA."9 The Brannon court considered two sep-
arate leaves taken by the plaintiff. If the FMLA protected either of these
absences, Ms. Brannon's termination for violating the defendant's ab-
sence control policy would have violated the FMLA, and would be un-
lawful. Ms. Brannon took the first leave as a result of an upper respira-
tory infection.'2 ° This, however, did not satisfy the court as a serious
health condition, and therefore the employer could compute the ab-
sence in the employer's absence control scheme.'
Ms. Brannon took the second absence to attend to her three-year-old
daughter, Miranda, who also suffered from an upper respiratory infec-
tion and an infected throat."' The court first concluded "that Miranda
had a 'serious health condition'" and "[i]f plaintiff satisfied the FMLA
notice requirements, then her absence was protected under the
FMLA."
123
By August 1995, the federal case law had dispelled the notion that an
employee must refer, or attempt to refer, to the FMLA as a source of
his or her rights." The clear cause and effect reasoning, exemplified
by the auto accident hypothetical in Midwest Plastic, began to fade.2 '
Oshkosh received notice of Ms. Brannon's absences by way of a note
from a physician, delivered by the plaintiffs husband, that said "Please
excuse off work till 1-12-94," and two phone calls stating "Miranda was
too sick for [Ms. Brannon] to come to work.""6 Noting that "[t]he Act
itself is silent regarding the notice which an employee must provide to
her employer""27 and that the regulations provide that the employee
"may only state the leave is needed," the court concluded that the em-
ployer had received adequate notice under the FMIA."5 The court ob-
at 379-83 (discussing the Brannon case in detail).
119. Brannon, 897 F. Supp. at 1030-31.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1037.
122. Id. at 1032.
123. Id. at 1037.
124. Id. at 1038. "'The employee need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA
or even mention the FMLA, but may only state that leave is needed.'" Id. (quoting 29
C.F.R § 825.303(b) (1995)) (emphasis omitted).
125. See supra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
126. Brannon, 897 F. Supp. at 1033.
127. Id. at 1037.
128. Id. at 1038 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(a) and (b) (1996) (concerning notice re-
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served that while "an employee must tell her employer the reason she is
absent," the courts were not imposing the specific notice requirements
on employees when Brannon was decided."
Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., °30 also decided by a district court in Au-
gust 1995, and also refusing to impose specific notice requirements on
employees, indicates that there are doubts regarding notice. 3' In
Hendry, the plaintiff suffered migraine headaches, as her employer
apparently knew." Some days the headaches were so severe that Ms.
Hendry could not work, but on other days they were less severe and,
even with a headache, she could work.'3 3 GTE alleged that Ms. Hendry
ultimately violated its absence control policy when she missed work
after phoning her supervisor and "report[ing] herself ill with a migraine
headache.""
While the Hendry court stated that an employee must "'provide at
least verbal notice sufficient to make the employer aware that the em-
ployee needs FMLA-qualifying leave,'"'" it conceded "Hendry arguably
complied with this requirement."" After her phone call, the court not-
ed, "the employer had a responsibility to inquire further" and "obtain
the necessary details."'37 The court asserted that once the employee
had stated the problem, the department supervisor was expected to
assess it, and possibly inform the employee of her FMLA benefits."
This trend was continued in October 1995 when a federal court of
appeals expressed its opinion"a reversing the original Manuel deci-
sion. '4 Because the interim DOL regulations had been revised by this
quirements for employees)).
129. See, e.g., Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., No. 94-0691, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 20996 (W.D. Dist. La. 1994) (preceding the final regulations issued in April
1995, requiring reference to FMLA), rev'd, 66 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995). But see gener-
ally supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text (discussing the lower Manuel court's
willingness to impose specificity from employers' requirements under the DOL regula-
tions).
130. 896 F. Supp. 816 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 819 (discussing the fact that Hendry was a long-time employee of GTE
and suffered migraine headaches during the last three year of her employment).
133. Id. at 820.
134. Id. at 828.
135. Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(c) (1996)).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995).
140. Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., No. 94-0691, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20996
(W.D. La. Nov. 30, 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995). "The district court held
that Manuel did not satisfy the notice requirements of the Family and Medical Leave
Act of 1993, because she did not expressly invoke the statute's protection when she
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time, eliminating an employee's need to invoke the FMLA, the appellate
court reviewed Manuel pursuant to the interim regulations.'4' The
case, however, is instructive.
The court of appeals soundly reversed the district court's decision in
Manuel.' While the appellate court perpetuated some confusion by
referring to the FMLA's "generous provisions" and refusing to "an-
nounce any categorical rules for the content of the notice by an em-
ployee," it clearly concluded that an employee need not specifically
refer to the Act." Employees are "ill-equipped to identify the statuto-
ry source of their rights,"" the court of appeals noted, stating "[t]hese
are workers, not lawyers."" The appellate court concluded that Con-
gress "did not intend employees like June Manuel to become conversant
with the legal intricacies" of the FMLA.'"
Early cases construing the employees' notice obligation may have
demanded more detail than necessary. Yet, by late 1995, courts no lon-
ger balanced the specific notice obligations imposed on employers with
clear-cut obligations imposed on employees.'47 While the initial
Manuel decision spoke of "sufficient notice to apprise an employer of
an employee's need to use FMLA-qualifying leave,"" the court of ap-
peals noted that Congress did not intend to impose "an onerous require-
ment on employees.""9 These two conclusions are, of course, not in-
consistent. Yet, there has been a shift in judicial expectations favoring
the employee.
notified her employer of her need for leave. We reverse and remand." Manuel, 66
F.3d at 759 (citation omitted).
141. Manuel, 66 F.3d at 761 n.2 (noting that "the interim regulations govern this
dispute since Westlake's decision to suspend Manuel in December 1993 occurred prior
to the release of the final regulations.").
142. Id. at 764.
143. Id. at 763.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 764.
147. See supra notes 116-46 and accompanying text.
148. Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., No. 94-0691, 1994 U.S. Dist LEXIS 20996,
at *10 (W.D. La. Nov. 30, 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 758 (5th .Cir. 1995).
149. Manuel, 66 F.3d at 763.
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AN EMERGING CONCEPT
As noted previously, in reversing the lower court's decision in
Manuel, the appellate court expressly exclaimed, "These are workers,
not lawyers."" The court was correct: June Manuel operated a ma-
chine for Westlake Polymers.15" ' From the other relevant cases it can
be determined that Debra Hendry was a service clerk,"2 Penny
Brannon worked in a production sewing job at Oshkosh," and Lori
Van Dosen reported to a "shift foreman." " But was the appellate
court merely stating a fact, or should courts construe this case as sug-
gesting an emerging concept?
Johnson v. Primerica, decided in January 1996, is instructive." Al-
though Johnson cites Manuel," the Johnson decision articulated a
new factor to assess the adequacy of an employee's notice under the
FMLA: the sophistication of the employee. 7
In Johnson, the plaintiff possessed a bachelor's degree, reported
directly to a vice president at Smith Barney, and held the position of
"group leader."" In that capacity, Mr. Johnson supervised four em-
ployees operating the company's principal inventory control system."
In October 1993, Mr. Johnson missed three consecutive days of work
without contacting his office." When confronted by his supervisor,
Mr. Johnson indicated he had not reported to work because "he was
handling personal matters" and needed additional leave "'to help his
family start up a family business.'""' Mr. Johnson was told to put this
request in writing."6 In his written request for additional leave, Mr.
Johnson asked for "the 'month of November off without pay...
to [attend to] a matter... of significant financial importance to [his]
immediate and extended family.''" Smith Barney denied this re-
150. Id.
151. Manuel, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20996, at *2.
152. Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816, 819 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
153. Brannon v. Oshkosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028, 1030 (N.D. Tenn. 1995).
154. Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng'g, No. 1:94-CV-525, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12130,
at *2 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 1995).
155. No. 94 Civ. 4869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 869 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1996).
156. See id. at *19 (discussing how the employee does not need to invoke the
FMLA by name, but must give sufficient information that the leave qualifies as FMLA
leave).
157. Id. at *19-20.
158. Id. at *2-3.
159. Id. at *3.
160. Id.
161. Id. at "3-4 (quoting Transcript at 49).
162. Id. at *4.
163. Id. (quoting Transcript at 19) (alterations in original).
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quest." Mr. Johnson missed several additional days of work in early
November, stating that on each day, his absence was the result of a
"back problem."" When Mr. Johnson was absent on an additional day
and failed to call his office with an explanation," Smith Barney fired
him, a result he had been warned of ten days earlier.'67
Mr. Johnson took no immediate action, but weeks later appeared at
Smith Barney's Human Resources Department "to ask the location to
which his former department had been moved."" Once it became ap-
parent that Mr. Johnson would not be reemployed, he claimed the
FMLA protected his absences." Mr. Johnson then alleged that he had
been required to attend to his son, who suffered from asthma. 7
First, the court asserted that the evidence presented by Mr. Johnson
concerning the child's health condition was insufficient to invoke FMLA
protection.' Next, the court stated that "[e]ven if the court were to
find that a serious health condition existed, Johnson ha[d] failed to
show that his words or actions gave Smith Barney notice of such ill-
ness.
"172
Mr. Johnson argued that his written request for leave was "inelegantly
drafted" and should be discounted because it was "generally known"
that his son suffered from asthma and that he had "intimated" to his
supervisor that his son was ill."
Mr. Johnson's arguments failed. Noting that an employer "is not re-
quired to be clairvoyant," the court proceeded to distinguish John-
son from Brannon75 and Manuel76 because Mr. Johnson's written
164. Id.
165. Id. at *5-6.
166. Id. at *6.
167. Id. Johnson testified "that he did not recall receiving the written warning." Id.
at *5.
168. Id. at *6.
169. Id.
170. Id. at *6-7.
171. Id. at *13-14.
172. Id. at *14.
173. Id. at *16-17.
174. Id. ("Nothing in the FMLA, or the governing regulations, however, suggests that
an employer's duty to inquire may be triggered solely by the employer's knowledge of
prior medical events.").
175. Id. at *17-18,
Johnson's reliance on Brannon v. Oshkosh B'Gosh, Inc. [citations omitted] is
misplaced. While Brannon acknowledges the employer's obligations under the
1229
request belied his claim for qualified FMLA leave.' 7 Keeping Brannon
and Manuel in mind, the court stated that Mr. Johnson could not
"shield himself behind inexperience or naivete.""8 The court called at-
tention to the fact that Mr. Johnson was an articulate individual and
was inclined to reveal personal matters, and therefore it was "not credi-
ble that Johnson would fail. to articulate a real medical reason when
drafting a leave request that was allegedly based on medical exigen-
cy. " 17
9
CONCLUSION
Current DOL regulations leave no doubt that employers must inform
employees of their "entitlement" to FMLA leave.'" These regulations
not only impose upon employers the obligation to provide written infor-
mation to employees, they direct employers to "responsively answer
questions from employees" concerning their rights and obligations un-
der the Act.'8 '
Obviously, employers must have a sound working knowledge of the
FMLA. While the notice requirements set forth in the current regula-
tions do not require employer analysis, an employer must understand
them.
An employment lawyer has noted that these regulations are a
"'nightmare'"'" and "'exactly the kind of thing that Newt Gingrich has
been criticizing as government nitpicking.'"' 3 Yet former Labor Secre-
tary Robert Reich has told Congress that it is "pretty easy" to comply
with the Act.'" Which assessment is correct? The answer. Neither as-
FMLA to make subsequent inquires when an employee gives notice of leave
needed to care for an ill child, Johnson overlooks the fact that the
employer's duty to conduct further inquiry into a leave request is first trig-
gered when an employee gives sufficient notice of a medical need for the
requested leave.
Id.
176. Id. at *19 ("Similarly, in Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., . . . the employer
was aware that the plaintiff was absent for medical reasons.").
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. at *19-20.
180. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (1994).
181. 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(d) (1996).
182. James L Dam, New 'Family Leave' Regs Make Employers Scramble, LAW.
WKLY. USA, Jan. 30, 1995, at 12 (quoting Robert Duston, employment lawyer from
Washington, D.C.).
183. Id. (quoting Chicago employment lawyer Gerald Skoning).
184. Bocarnazo, supra note 73, at 16.
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sessment is correct, certainly not when the time arrives to implement
the Act's notice requirements.
First, consider the notice that employers must give employees of
their rights and obligations. While the regulations describe what is re-
quired in significant detail, the "government nitpicking" argument"s is
countered by the commentator who observed that the Act "generally
provides clear direction as to employers' obligations.""s Although an
employer may not find these directions "pretty easy," still they are not a
"nightmare."
8 7
Second, and perhaps more importantly, consider the notice employ-
ees must give employers of the need for protected FMLA leave. Here
again, administration of the Act could not be construed as pretty easy,
but with adequate information and proper training, the result need not
be a nightmare. Thus, there are two factors to consider the adequacy
of information received and the proper training of appropriate person-
nel.
In Manuel, the plaintiff gave notice to her supervisor,"8 in Midwest
Plastic, notice was given to a shift foreman;" in both Brannon"
and Hendry,'9 ' notice was given to a supervisor, and in the Johnson
case, notice was given to Mr. Johnson's supervisor, a vice president.'92
In each case the person receiving notice was the appropriate person to
receive notice. Comments leading to the current DOL regulations make
clear that "[tihe employee is required to provide notice of need to take
FMLA leave to the same person(s) within the company the employee
ordinarily contacts to request other forms of leave."'" Management
must, therefore, train all supervisors who receive leave requests. It
185. See Dam, supra note 182, at 12.
186. Lawrence B. Fine et al., Family, Medical Leave Legislation: Ensuring Corpo-
rate Compliance, NAT'L UJ., Mar. 8, 1993, at S9.
187. See supra notes 180-81 and accompanying text.
188. Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., No. 94-0691, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20996,
at *3 (W.D. La. Nov. 30, 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995).
189. Reich v. Midwest Plastic Eng'g, No. 1:94-CV-525, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12130,
at *2-3 (W.D. Mich. July 22, 1995).
190. Brannon v. Oshkosh B'Gosh, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 1028, 1031 (M.D. Tenn. 1995).
191. Hendry v. GTE North, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 816, 819 (N.D. Ind. 1995).
192. Johnson v. Primerica, No. 94 Civ. 4869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 869, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1996).
193. THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAvE AcT OF 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2180, 2220 (1995)
(to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825) (answering comments concerning to whom no-
tice should be given).
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follows that management should limit the number of supervisors au-
thorized to perform this function, and train them in depth. This limita-
tion would be an advisable step considering the adequacy of the infor-
mation the FMLA requires an employee to provide.
Consider what case law has shown. Early cases demonstrated an
inclination to demand that an employee provide specific information,
either invoking the FMLAN or at least expressing a cause and effect
relationship between the serious health conditions and an absence from
work.'95 Clearly, later case law and current DOL regulations eliminate
the need to refer specifically to the FMLA. '
Thus, while there has been clarification as to what steps employees
are not required to take (e.g., cite the FMLA, provide written notice, or
notify some top official of the company),'97 employers must still glean
from judicial construction of the Act what steps employees must take.
To date, no jurisdiction has suggested any specific language or content
required in the notice, but it has been suggested that the content of the
employee's notice "will depend upon the facts and circumstances of
each individual case."'"
Accounting for the fact that most employees "are workers, not law-
yers," employers must now be trained to assess the information they
receive." On the other hand, the Johnson case indicates that the bur-
den placed on employees is linked to the employee's ability to provide
information.2" Mr. Johnson held a college degree, was not "disinclined
to reveal personal matters," nor was he an "inarticulate individual."20 '
Most employees claiming FMLA leave probably will not fit Mr.
Johnson's profile. There are people, however, who do not openly reveal
the condition of their health or the health of family members due to the
personal and perhaps even embarrassing nature of such conditions. Su-
pervisors authorized to receive leave requests must now learn to cope
with an employee's desire for privacy, and realize when the employer's
obligation to "inquire further" has been triggered.
As a final note, Manuel foretold Johnson by referring to the sophisti-
cation of employees.2" Johnson, in turn, noted that the plaintiff had
194. See Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., No. 94-0691, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20996, at *10 (W.D. La. Nov. 30, 1994), rev'd, 66 F.3d 758 (5th Cir. 1995).
195. See Brannon, 897 F. Supp. at 1037.
196. See supra notes 116-49 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 135-49 and accompanying text.
198. Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp., 66 F.3d 758, 764 (5th Cir. 1995).
199. Id. at 763.
200. Johnson v. Primerica, No. 94 Civ. 4869, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 869, at *14-20
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 29, 1996).
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 139-50 and accompanying text.
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failed to show that his words or actions gave notice of the alleged ill-
ness.' While no other case suggests that an employee may communi-
cate information by his actions, there is an adage that says actions
speak louder than words. On this point, the current regulations are un-
clear with regard to both.2"
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203. Johnson, 1996 U.S. Dist LEXIS 869, at *16.
204. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 825.302-.303 (1996) (discussing employee notice re-
quirements under the FMLA).

